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Graham v. Angelone
No. 99-4, 1999 WL 710385
(4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1999)1
L Facts
In the early morning hours of October 8, 1993, Andre L. Graham
("Graham") and another man, allegedly Mark Sheppard ("Sheppard"),
approached the car of Sheryl Stack ("Stack"). Stack was seated in her car
with her companion, Edward Martin ("Martin"). Graham, with a gun in
hand, told Stack and Martin to exit the car and instructed Martin to give his
wallet and car keys to Sheppard. Sheppard started Stack's car and then got
in Martin's car where he saw some compact discs ("CDs"). During this
time, Graham told Stack and Martin to lie down and close their eyes. They
did as he directed and Graham shot each of them in the head. Graham and
Sheppard then drove off in Martin's car. Stack later died from her wound
but Martin lived and testified. A few days later, Priscilla Booker ("Booker"),
who lived with Graham, found over 200 CDs in the trunk of her car.
Graham told Booker that he had bought them and Booker put them in
storage.2
While incarcerated on another charge, Martin telephoned Booker in the
presence of Gary McGregor ("McGregor"), a deputy sheriff, who overheard
Martin tell Booker to throw away a bag in his closet. McGregor relayed this
information to his superiors and the police searched Booker's apartment and
found a .45 caliber pistol in a plastic bag in a closet. A firearms expert
testified that the gun was the source of the bullets recovered from Stack and
Martin and a cartridge from the scene. The police also recovered Martin's
CDs from a locker rented by Booker's mother. A fingerprint expert testi-
fied that many of the identifiable prints on the CDs were Graham's.'
Graham was convicted on eight felony counts, including the capital
murder of Stack. The jury recommended the death sentence based on the
future dangerousness and vileness predicates and the trial court adopted the
jury's recommendation. 4 Graham's appeals to the Supreme Court of Vir-
1. This is an unpublished opinion referenced in the "Table of Decisions Without
Reported Opinions" at 191 F.3d 447 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Graham v. Angelone, No. 99-4, 1999 WL 710385, at *1-3 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1999).
3. Id., at *2-3.
4. Id., at *3. Specifically, the jury found "(1) that Graham was a continuing serious
threat to society (the future dangerousness' predicate), and (2) that Graham's murder of Stack
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ginia and the United States Supreme Court were unsuccessful. Prior to state
habeas proceedings, Graham's appointed counsel withdrew and another
attorney was appointed. This attorney did not learn of his appointment
until a few days before Graham's petition was due. The new counsel was
allowed to amend Graham's state habeas petition and raised three grounds
for relief.' The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the petition and denied
a motion for rehearing.6
Graham's application for federal habeas relief was denied by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Graham
then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
denial of Graham's writ of habeas corpus with respect to the claims for
which a certificate of appealability was granted. The Court also denied
Graham's motion for a certificate of appealability on his remaining claims
and dismissed his appeal
IIL Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. AEDPA and Retroactive Effect
Graham argued that although his application for federal habeas relief
was filed after the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996'
(AEDPA") had taken effect, AEDPA should not apply to his claims
because it had an impermissible retroactive effect. To substantiate this
argument, Graham asserted that had he known about the effects of the
was 'vile' in that it involved 'depravity of mind' (the 'vileness' predicate)." Id.
5. His asserted grounds for relief were ineffective assistance of counsel, the Common-
wealth's failure to provide him with exculpatory material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), and denial of meaningful and rational review of his death sentence. Graham,
1999 WL 710385, at *3.
6. Id., at *4.
7. Id.
8. Id., at *21. The court's disposition of several of Graham's claims will not be
discussed in this article due to the fact that they add nothing of substance to capital defense
law in Virginia. These claims include the following: (1) Graham's attacks on 28 U.S.C. S
2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA"),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; (2) a sufficiency of the evidence claim as to whether he
was the triggerman; (3) whether his procedural defaults should have been dismissed due to
cause and prejudice; (4) numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (5) his challenge of
the constitutionality of the verdict forms; (6) his challenge of the constitutionality of the
future dangerousness predicate; and (7) whether he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id.,
at *4-7, *10-20.
9. 28 U.S.C. Title 153, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (CAEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
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amendment previously, he would have raised all of his claims in his first
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Applying its
holding in Mueller v. Angelone,1" the Fourth Circuit rejected Graham's
argument. As the court noted in Mueller, "[w]e find even the suggestion that
petitioner might have withheld legitimate claims from his petition for
certiorari so that they would be considered by a federal court for the first
time on habeas review illogical and thus unpersuasive." 1
The court's analysis of Graham's argument falls succinctly in line with
its previous decision in Mueller. In order to overcome the high standard set
forth in Mueller,2 counsel must show that the application of AEDPA creates
novel problems that were not possible in pre-AEDPA cases. For example,
federal habeas counsel should demonstrate that reliance on pre-AEDPA
procedures so impaired appellate argument that the retroactive effect of
AEDPA is an impossible hurdle. 3
B. Claim of Innocence to Overcome Default
In an attempt to overcome the procedural default of many of his
claims, Graham raised a claim of actual innocence under Scblup v. Delo."4
The Scblup Court held that in order for a petitioner to satisfy a "gateway"
innocence claim, the petitioner "must show that it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in ligbt of the new evi-
dence.""5 The district court rejected Graham's claim purporting to apply
Scblup but actually using a "clear and convincing" standard derived from
Sawyer v. Whitley.16 In Sawyer, the Supreme Court held that a habeas
petitioner "must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a
constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner
10. 181 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999).
11. Graham, 1999 WL 710385, at *5 (quoting Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 571
(4th Cir. 1999)).
12. A petitioner may avoid the application of the AEDPA-amended 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)
only if its application "would attach new legal consequences such that the party affected
might have acted differently had he known that his conduct would be subject to the new
law." Mueller, 181 F.3d at 569.
13. See Kimberly A. Orem, Case Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 221, 224 (1999) (analyzing
Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999), and suggesting that reliance-based argu-
ments may move courts not to impose harsh AEDPA-amendments of section 2254).
14. 513 U.S. 298 (1995). TheFourth Circuit explained that "[u]nder Scblup, a 'claim
of innocence is ... not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a
habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on
the merits.'" Graham, 1999 WL 710385, at *7 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315
(1995)).
15. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added).
16. 505 U.S. 333 (1992). Sawyer, who was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death due to the presence of aggravating factors, made a gateway claim to show
that he was "actually innocent" of the death penalty, not of the murder itself. Id. at 335-36.
2000] 437
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eligiblefor the death penalty."7 Graham argued that the district court should
have applied the Schlup "more likely than not" standard because his claim
was that he was actually innocent of capital murder whereas Sawyer's "clear
and convincing" standard applies when the defendant contests a finding of
a special circumstance rendering the defendant eligible for death."8
The Court of Appeals declared that Graham's assertion of actual
innocence did not meet the standard announced in either Schlup or Sawyer.19
Thus, the court saw no reason to determine which standard applied.2" The
evidence on which Graham based his claim of actual innocence consisted of
two letters allegedly written by Sheppard. According to Graham, the letters
purportedly showed that Sheppard was the perpetrator."i In ruling against
Graham the court seemed to apply Schiup rather than Sawyer. The court
specifically held that "we are not at all persuaded that it was more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Graham in view of
the new evidence."'
Neither Schiup nor Sawyer directly addresses Graham's claim that he
was innocent of capital murder. Graham's "gateway" claim of innocence
was based on the notion that he should not have been convicted of capital
murder because he was not the triggerman. The Scblup analysis applies only
to claims of actual innocence and the Sawyer analysis applies only to post-
conviction death eligibility. Neither case specifically applies to cases in
which the petitioner claims he was guilty of murder, but innocent of capital
murder. The court's citation of Calderon v. Thompson23 does little to decide
which standard would apply in such a case. Unlike Calderon, in which the
"jury... found the special circumstance of murder during the commission
17. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992) (emphasis added).
18. Graham, 1999 WL 710385, at *7.
19. Id., at *8.
20. Id. The court did attempt to explain that the nature of the habeas applicant's daim
is the deciding factor of which standard to apply:
[To the extent a capital petitioner daims he did not kill the victim the Schlup
more likely than not standard applies, whereas [t~o the extent a capital petitioner
contests tie special circumstances rendering him eligible for the death penalty,
the Sawyer cear and convincing standard applies, irrespective of whether the
special circumstances are elements of the of ense of capital murder or, as here,
mere sentencing enhancers.
Id., at *7 (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 560 (1998)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
21. Id., at *8-10. One of the letters reinforced that Graham maintained ossession of
the murder weapon after trial, which would provide more circumstantial evience that he
was the triggerman. The other letter chastised Graham for implicating Sheppard, the alleged
author, in the murders. Id.
22. Id., at *10.
23. 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
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of rape, making Thompson eligible for the death penalty,"24 triggerman
status in Virginia is not a "special circumstance" or a sentence enhancer. It
is an element that the Commonwealth must prove to convict the defendant
of capital murder. Thus, it does not fall squarely into either of the two
niches that Schiup and Sawer carve.
Schiup better fits Graham's claim than does Sawyer. By its literal terms,
Schlup applies to cases of "actual innocence." Indeed, Graham claimed that
he was actually innocent of capital murder, but not of murder itself, because
of the triggerman rule. The Schiup Court did not consider situations created
by triggerman rules, but the broad "innocence" language would seem to
encompass such situations. Given the Fourth Circuit's treatment of the
issue, habeas counsel should cite Graham for the proposition that the "more
likely than not" standard of Schlup applies to claims of actual innocence of
capital murder based on the triggerman rule. It is important to argue that
Schiup applies because the "more likely than not" standard is lower than the
"clear and convincing" standard employed in Sawyer. In order to succeed
on this type of claim under Schlup, a petitioner would need to present new
triggerman evidence showing that it is more likely than not that he would
not have been convicted of capital murder had this evidence been presented
to a jury."
Matthew S. T. Clark
24. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 544.
25. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
2000)
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